The Contribution of Space Technologies to Arctic Policy Priorities

Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and Beyond (September, 2008) Policy Implications Sovereignty

Improving military security and protection of state border in relation to increased terrorist threats Maritime delimitation in accordance with international law Continued interest with Russia’s role in Spitsbergen

Safety

Regional agreement on search and rescue for the Arctic Expanding polar fleet to facilitate and monitor increased shipping Construction of maritime check-points to improve navigation monitoring Assistance with cross pole air-born navigation Chemical safety from industrial sites and mitigating contaminated sites

Environment

Mitigating environmental impacts from industrial activity Strengthening regional governance institutions for effective resource management and environmental protection Expansion of protected areas (land and sea) Recycling of aging nuclear fleet Monitoring environmental conditions in the Arctic Meteorological stations Develop modern customs infrastructure Expanding hydro-carbon production in the Arctic Sea Assessing resource potential across vast territory by improved geological-geophysical, hydrographic and cartographical mapping Improved infrastructure for sea mineral production and Arctic fishing Expansion of conventional (oil and gas) and non-conventional (renewable) energy resources

Economic Development

Indigenous and Social Development

Improved information technology and communications Improved quality of life and social conditions for indigenous peoples Social infrastructure investments in education, housing and health-care

yy Comprehensive ability to monitor air and vessel traffic, in air, on land/ice and off-shore yy Expanding existing communications networks yy Effective navigation ability in air, on land/ice and off-shore yy Effective funding for relevant scientific research

Capability Requirements

yy Assessment of known and estimated resource base yy Comprehensive information on weather and ice conditions yy Detection and monitoring of pollution events yy Real-time satellite imagery and navigation data streams yy Satellite/fibre optic-based communications technologies yy In-situ environmental observations yy Up-to-date infrastructure to support movement of goods and services yy Communications and broadband connections

Information Requirements

B.1.10 China China and the Arctic Facts in Brief

Background: China has yet to release an official Arctic policy at the state level. Instead, its position on Arctic affairs has been limited to individual references from the state on specific issues, most notably on its Arctic/Antarctic science program, its growing commercial interest in resource development, and its diplomatic ambition of joining the Arctic Council as an Observer. Areas of interest: Research, commercial shipping, mining, oil and gas. Responsible Organizations: The only formal agency dealing with the Arctic is the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA), a division of the State Oceanic Administration. The CAA is responsible for coordinating its research programs; as of April 2012, it had organized four Arctic missions (1999, 2003, 2008, and 2010) and 23 Antarctic science missions since 1985 on its research icebreaker Xuelong. In 2003 it opened its only permanent Arctic science station in Ny-Alesund, Svalbard. It will conduct a mission to the Arctic in the summer of 2012, through the Northern Sea Route. The mission will be the first time a Chinese vessel will sail the pass. Status: China is In the process of drafting an official policy, however the timeline of when it will be released is unknown. Coverage: To date, China has had a larger and longer research interest in Antarctica. Being a new player in the region’s politics with no geographic connection, China is approaching the Arctic from the standpoint of cooperation, not Until now, China’s Arctic research agenda has identified four primary research objectives: oceanography, biology, atmospheric science, and glaciology. Although the Chinese government has linked its research objectives with localized impacts of climate change in China, there are ulterior motives for these research areas, particularly in the potential for Arctic continental shipping lanes and energy production. China’s interests in the region are slowly growing beyond research, however. The growing demand for rare earth metals and iron has taken Chinese companies to Greenland and Northern Canada (Nunavik). PetroChina’s purchasing of 20% of the Royal Dutch Shell’s Groundbirch shale-gas assets in February 2012 will likely open up access to Canadian Arctic fossil fuels. intimidation, and is starting with research as its basis. Web link: http://www.chinare.gov.cn/en/index.html

Principle Objectives

57 B. INVENTORY OF ARCTIC POLICIES AND INDUSTRY INTERESTS