Mining for Closure: Policies, practises and guidelines for sustainable mining and closure of mines

dressing the above three matters, particular emphasis was placed on four approaches: ‘Good Samaritan’ legislation; 95 Permit blocking; Allocative versus joint and several respon- sibility; and Non-compliance registries. In essence, the report lists a number of very real bar- riers and disincentives that Canada must seek to deal with if real collaboration between different social ac- tors is to be achieved in order to speed the restitution of lands affected by the legacies of mining. More specifically, Castrilli reports that in regard to reg- ulatory or institutional barriers, federal and provincial environmental and mining laws in Canada contain a number of permit, regulation, and other require- ments that likely would have to be complied with by those voluntarily undertaking abandoned mine land abatement, remediation, and reclamation. In regard to liability disincentives he indicates that federal and provincial law in Canada contains a vari- ety of judge-made and statutory authorities that could impose quasi-criminal, civil, or administrative liabil- ity on those undertaking abandoned mine land abate- ment, remediation, and reclamation activities. While he notes exceptions to this, they appear limited. In regard to collaborative opportunities, a number of voluntary assessments and abandonedmine land cleanups have been completed, or are on- going, by provincial governments in Canada. Interestingly, these initiatives have been undertaken without legislative reform. In general, Castrilli finds that there is no existing or proposed federal or provin- cial legislation in Canada regarding the subject of Good Samaritan legislation, though there may be some statutory developments that could be said to be analogous to, or precedents for, such legislation. Some existing law implicitly, though not explic- itly, may have the same effect as permit blocking. Finally, there is some law, policy, and practice in existence regarding non-compliance registries and allocative versus joint and several liability. In comparison, Castrilli notes that there appear to be many more legislative measures in place or pro- posed at the federal and state level in the United • • • •

be taken on the legislative side to support funding, and measures required on the legislative side to al- low works to proceed. The first of these relates directly to activities de- scribe in the call for action from the EBRD cited at the start of Section 5.1 and also reflects the content called for in the description of the PMA initiative included in Section 4.2.1. 5.1.2 funding approaches – an example As stated in Section 4.2.2, a report titled “Potential Funding Approaches for Orphaned/Abandoned Mines in Canada” (Castrilli, 2003) was prepared that outlined a variety of funding approaches to be considered for the clean up or management of liabilities related to OAMs. The report concludes that no single funding approach would constitute a complete solution and that a combination of a number of approaches would likely be required. Mechanisms to further discuss and develop fund- ing approaches are still underway. As a part of this ongoing work, a multi-stakeholder workshop on “Strategies and Issues of Assessing Liabilities and Funding” is being planned for the fall of 2005. A summary of the recommendations is included in Box 4. 94 While a great deal of this material is con- sidered to be relevant in an SEE context, the reader is reminded that the findings presented here are as delivered to a Canadian governmental audience should be interpreted as examples only. 5.1.3 dealing with regulatory and institutional barriers – an example This second example is also drawn from the Canadi- an NOAMI program as reported by Castrilli (2002). Again, the reader should be aware that the findings presented here were delivered to a Canadian govern- mental audience and should be seen as examples only. This report, titled “Barriers to Collaboration: Orphaned/Abandoned Mines in Canada” examines existing legislative requirements in Canada, selected other North American jurisdictions, and a number of other countries that pertain to: regulatory or institutional barriers; liability disincentives, and collaborative opportunities regarding volun- tary abatement, remediation, and reclamation of orphaned/abandoned mine lands. In ad- 1. 2. 3.

94. Derived from Castrilli (2003) – in particular – pages 11-12 and Sections X & XI. 95. As described in footnotes to Section 4.2.2.

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MINING FOR CLOSURE