Mining for Closure: Policies, practises and guidelines for sustainable mining and closure of mines

in positions of power or responsibility, seek per- sonal benefit from mining activities and/or seek to oppose the implementation of Mining for Closure principles for the reason that the monies available for diversion for personal gain are reduced. In juris- dictions where good governance and the rule of law have not been established, it is feasible that such actors may be able to act in this manner. Indeed, Stephen Stec (personal communication: Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Eu- rope, 2005, 7 July) argues that in certain economies and especially transitional ones, the problem of underpaid and therefore corruptible officials is en- demic and has an influence on decision-making re- lated to mining. According to Stec, the large sums of money in mining, combined with authorities in a position to approve or influence mining projects that are not always motivated by the public interest alone, is a serious problem. 59 Such factors however, should be seen as socio-po- litical aberrations, and not an argument against Mining for Closure . The rule of law as evidenced in measures such as the control of corruption, respect for property rights, the elimination of bribery, and the transparent distribution of revenues have been clearly linked to the economic success of mining nations (Andrews, 2002). 59. As such, unclear legal regimes are recognised to add uncer- tainty with respect to many aspects of “Mining for Closure” includ- ing in particular financial assurance requirements. Special meas- ures must be taken to ensure that financial assurance on paper is financial assurance in reality – especially where institutions and legal frameworks are less secure.

vestment subsidy offering for mine developments made by a host government constitutes a key in- gredient for such decision making. Thirdly, and closely related to the point made in Section 1 about “junior” miners – lax frameworks may attract just the kind of industrial actors that can be detrimen- tal to the interests of many national stakeholders – that is, miners that do not pursue environmental and social performance seriously. The third area introduced, requires that the effect upon the rents available to government must be con- sidered. Perceptions may exist that investment in Mining for Closure will reduce the economic benefit that can be obtained from a mineral resource. While this might be a feasible scenario in the short term, it appears reasonable to immediately refute this when consideration of the mine-life is taken into account. While it is clear that there are costs involved in the conduct of best environmental and social practice, it is the role of government to ensure an optimum yield frommining in the medium to long-term. The accrual of environmental and social externalities in order to provide short-term internal gain hardly appears to be an optimal approach. Further, and as discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, the ongoing con- duct of Mining for Closure by miners – while they are mining, represents an efficient, if not the optimal, economic outcome. That is the investment to pre- venting external costs ex ante is significantly less than the costs associated with making good environ- mental and/or social damage ex post .

The final point addressed here is related to corrup- tion – in particular where individuals or authorities

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MINING FOR CLOSURE