Mining for Closure: Policies, practises and guidelines for sustainable mining and closure of mines

mining legacies, and the rehabilitation of existing legacies, are not put in place, then future national tax-payers will have to pay much more for the work and present stakeholders will have to endure the environmental and social nuisances in the mean- time. The following citation from the Assistant Deputy Minister for the Province of Ontario’s Ministry of Northern Development and Mines (MNDM) (Gam- mon, 2002) underlines the position that Govern- ments around the world are faced with as a result of poor governance and industrial environmental practice in the past: 36 In coming to grips with the problem Ontario first felt a need to classify and inventory these site lo- cations. An initial commissioned survey of paper records indicated that there would be on the order of 600 individual features to be dealt with at an estimated total cost of Cdn$500 million. It was further estimated that some 40% of these sites re- mained in private ownership while 60% had re- verted to the Crown and formed a liability for the Ontario taxpayer. The Ontario government has reluctantly recog- nized that it is not practically possible to apply the “polluter pays” principle in dealing with this legacy. The original operators have long disap- peared, the commodities produced have been con- sumed and the taxes paid have been incorporated in general revenues. The current industry consists of totally different players behaving in accordance with the regulatory framework that the govern- ment now has in place. There appears to be no real alternative than to allocate public funds to deal with the worst sites. While there are other advantages defining the gov- ernmental case for pursuit of Mining for Closure , it suffices to summarise them within the following broad categories: the prevention of harmful environmental and social impacts, lower risk of non-compliances, greater acceptance/less resistance from key stakeholders (in particular local communities and land owners), • • •

improved access to land resources from gov- ernments; improved access to capital from reputable lending institutions; the potential for reduced cost of capital and li- ability insurance; continual feedback upon the manner in which community expectations are being achieved. As is discussed in essentially all informed sources, it is in the best interest of business for such activities to take place at the right phase of mine life in order to minimise such expenditures. As mine decom- missioning usually occurs at a point in the life of an operation where the economic recovery of minerals has ceased, and cash flows are minimal or non-exist- ent, then this is not the time to be undertaking the bulk of rehabilitation operations. The overall mine decommissioning process should be integrated with the overall mine operation planning process. Further, if decommissioning and closure are not un- dertaken in a planned and effective manner, chances are that the results will also be sub-optimal. 2.2.2 the governmental case Traditionally, good governments have had a principal accountability for considering environmental and social externalities while the focus of mining com- panies has been on internal efficiency concerns. At first glance – and especially for environmentally aware stakeholders – the case for governments pursuing the implementation of best environmental practice mining and/or Mining for Closure , would appear clear. If miners do not internalise the costs of mine site rehabilitation and other social and/or environmental impacts related to closure, then Governments will have to do so on behalf of soci- ety. Such works would have to be paid for from the public purse. Further, for reasons mirroring those outlined in Section 2.2.1, their conduct is likely to be less efficient and less effective than if performed by the miner. However, there are arguments that the imposition of costs on the industry can have detrimental ef- fects, principally as a barrier to investment and development. 35 This said, mining legacies could be deemed to be the result of past and present governance failure that is shared by essentially all mining countries. Herein lies the arguments for governments to pursue Mining for Closure – if regu- latory frameworks ensuring efficient prevention of • • • •

35. These are discussed in more detail in Section 2.4, refer also to Miller (1998; 2005). 36. Detail references to, and the contents of Canadian work in this area are addressed in Sections 4.2.2, 5.1.2, and 5.1.3.

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MINING FOR CLOSURE